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Abstract:
Synergy is a concept fraught with ambiguity about its sources and effects, perhaps as
a consequence of of previous literature on the subject not distinguishing between
these. In this paper, the sources of synergy are separated from the sources of
sustainable competitive advantage in order to analyze the competitive implications
of different types of synergies, and thus be able to answer the question of when and
under which circumstances synergy can be expected to generate sustainable
competitive advantage.
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Synergies and Sustainable Competitive Advantage
Vertically and horizontally integrated firms exists for a number of reasons.
Adam Smith argued that the degree of division of labor is limited by the extent of the
market. If demand is insufficient to obtain maximum scale efficiency in certain
activities and market imperfections prevent selling excess capacity to external
customers, then scale efficient activities provide a rationale for sharing capacity
among different lines of business internally (Teece, 1982). The internal workings of
firms may also create pressure for growth in the range and size of activities
performed. As explained by Edith Penrose (1959), indivisibilities lead to organic
growth because increasing the degree of capacity utilization of existing assets
through sharing between different uses lead to the acquisition of complementary or
supporting resources. These new assets will also be indivisible to some degree, thus
leading to continued pressure to expand the size of the corporation to avoid idleness
of resources. Dedication of activities to other, complementary, activities also lead to
expansion of the firm because dedication creates vulnerability to appropriation of
rents by trading partners (Williamson, 1985). For these reasons, firms tend to become
diversified in terms of activities and markets served. It is generally believed that the
diversity in the assets and activities of diversified firms can be exploited to achieve
benefits, often referred to as synergies, by sharing assets and associated activities
subject to size economies (economies of scale/scope) or by performing mutually
adjusted (complementary) activities.
I. Sources of synergies
Synergies may be obtained by sharing assets between business units if
production based on these assets are subject to declining average unit cost, that is if
economies of scale or scope can be obtained. One source of size economies is
equipment dedicated to a particular task, which allows this task to be performed
with greater efficiency than with generic or non-specific equipment (Montgomery
and Wernerfelt, 1988). Increased division of labor and specialization of tasks allows
subsets of activities to be performed with greater efficiency by reducing the costs of
setting up and changing tasks, and by accumulating more experience and knowledge
of the particular task. Dedicated equipment and specialized tasks are only efficient
when the services they produce are required in high volumes because dedication and
specialization comes with a loss of flexibility that reduce the value in alternative use.
Thus dedication and specialization create indivisible capacity. Sharing can reduce the
loss from idleness of indivisible assets by increasing the degree of capacity
utilization. Finally, increasing the dimensions of physical objects (e.g. buildings) may
be less costly than multiplying similar, but smaller ones to reach a sufficient scale
(Langlois, 1997).
Efficiency gains can also be achieved by adapting different assets or activities
to a common purpose by making them mutually supportive and eliminate waste
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from reworking of outputs (Porter, 1996). Complementarity can be achieved in a
succession of activities where different steps in a chain are adjusted to the preceding
and/or proceeding steps for example in the timing of transfer (e.g. JIT), or by
improving the interface between activities (making the output fit the input
requirements, and/or changing the input requirements to fit the output) (Porter,
1985). Likewise, by adapting to existing resources, new assets can be made more
efficient and new opportunities can be exploited faster than if the complementary
assets had to be acquired as well. The effects of obtaining complementarity between
activities performed in succession will be referred to as vertical complementarities,
which  can also be obtained at higher (strategic) levels, for example by accompanying
product line proliferation, or increased rate of product development, with flexible
manufacturing systems and increased customer segmentation (Milgrom and Roberts,
1990).
Complementarities achieved by combining assets or activities to perform a
single task can similarly be called horizontal complementarities. Horizontal
complementarities may be achieved by adapting parallel activities to each other to
increase the value of combining the outputs at a later stage, for example by making
intermediate products that fit together when assembled (Whitney, 1988), or by
enhancing the combined functionality of bundled products to customers (Spiller and
Zelner, 1997).
In other words, synergy can be attributed:
1. Sharing of indivisible assets whose acquisition cost are amortized over multiple uses.
2. Optimization of the fit among sequentially performed activities (Vertical complementari-
ties).
3. Combination of the outputs of mutually adjusted activities to achieve superior functionality
of the combined output (Horizontal complementarities).
Important contributors to the field of corporate strategy, such as, Igor Ansoff
(1965) and Michael E. Porter (1985, 1987, 1996), argue that synergies confer
competitive advantage on diversified firms relative to non-diversified firms.
However, competitors may be able to achieve similar advantages by diversifying
their activities, in which case synergy only results in competitive parity. The purpose
of this paper is to explore under which circumstances the rents created by synergy
can be sustained1.
II. Sources of sustainable competitive advantage
The foundations of competitive advantage for firms has been explored in two
                                                          
1 By sustainable is usually meant lasting beyond any competitor’s attempt at circumventing the advantage by
imitating or substituting the rent generating features of a firm. The concept of sustainability does not, however,
say anything about the chronological duration of a competitive advantage although it may be considered infinite
in the absence of imitation, substitution and innovation, because even when the advantage is no longer being
challenged, it may persist.
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broad research streams, one looking for advantages in firm’s endowments of
resources (e.g. Peteraf, 1993, Barney, 1986, 1991) and the configuration of activities
(e.g. Porter, 1996), and another exploring the posture and positioning of firms vis á
vis their competitors (e.g. Porter, 1980, 1991, Ghemawat, 1991).
The resource-based perspective (RBP) and the positioning stream may be
seen as complementary because they are concerned with different domains (i.e.
internal and external factors, respectively), and thus combines to a refined SWOT
analysis (Barney, 1991). Studies have found that both industry and firm-level
indicators have significant effect on firm performance (e.g. Schmalensee, 1985;
Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989; Rumelt, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Brush,
Bromiley and Hendrickx, 1999) which suggests that the positioning stream and the
resource-based stream are complementary. Thus, Mauri and Michaels (1998) found
that industry affiliation is the prime determinant of R&D and advertising
expenditures, which is interpreted as intra-industry imitation of successful
competitors’ strategies, whereas performance primarily is determined by firm-
specific factors (i.e. the efficiency of implementing strategies). Similarly, Young,
Smith and Grimm (1996) found that performance is primarily determined at the firm
level while industry effects are of secondary importance. Industry effects was, thus,
found to be the prime determinant of the average performance of firms within an
industry by Young et al. (ibid.). In other words, industry might be the most
important factor in determining performance for the average firm, whereas firm
effects determine the performance of high-performance firms. The following sections
will describe and contrast the two perspectives on the sources of competitive
advantage.
The positioning stream
The positioning stream emerged from the structure-conduct-performance
paradigm in industrial economics (Porter, 1981), whose explanatory logic was
inverted through Michael E. Porter’s seminal book, Competitive Strategy (Porter,
1980). Porter’s book sought to provide a framework for identifying positions which
offered protection from the forces of competition. Protection from competition would
allow companies to achieve competitive advantage compared to firms possessing less
attractive positions. In contrast, SCP sought to explain why competition was limited,
and how it could be increased.
Pankaj Ghemawat’s book, Commitment (1991) includes Porter’s framework,
but extends his analysis by applying game theoretic insights to strategy formulation
arguing that commitment (i.e. investments and decisions which are costly to reverse)
to a selected strategy would deter competition, because competitors would expect
profit eroding retaliation from firms threatened by their move.
Thus, the positioning stream argues that sustainable competitive advantage
results from the ability to protect a desirable position within an industry by erecting
barriers to competition. These barriers would be identified during the analysis of an
industry (Porter, 1980) or in the process of evaluating strategic choices (Ghemawat,
1991). While threats of retaliation might deter entry and discipline responses from
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existing competitors, market power advantages may only be available to dominant
firms, and perhaps only for a limited time since they can be eroded by innovation
and changes in market size and preferences (Williamson, 1994). The threat of
retaliation may therefore have to be complemented with other barriers to
competition, such as specialized assets, switching and search costs, consumer and
producer learning, team-embodied skills, unique resources, special information,
patents and trademarks, reputation and image, and legal restrictions on entry
(Rumelt, 1984). The RBP treats these barriers as resources which the RBP has
developed tools for analyzing.
The resource-based perspective
One of the main research agendas within RBP is to understand when a firm’s
resources become a source of sustainable competitive advantage. The basic
assumption of RBP is that the qualities and quantities of resources are unevenly
dispersed among competitors. The heterogeneity of the resource bases of different
firms means that firms are presented with different opportunities for sharing and
adapting their portfolios of assets. The RBP furthermore suggests that assets are
accumulated over time (Penrose, 1959, Dierickx and Cool, 1989) and new productive
uses are discovered in the process of exploiting and experimenting with the services
of the resources (Penrose, 1959). Time thus increases heterogeneity, and the greater
the diversity of a firm’s asset stock, the greater are the number and variety of
potential resource combinations, and consequently opportunities for synergy,
available to the firm.
If the supply of resources is inadequate to meet the demands for the services
of these resources, inferior resources will be used, thus giving firms that possess the
best resources above-normal rates of return because of the comparative advantage of
their resources (Peteraf, 1993). Resources may be rare because the supply of them is
fixed, such as fertile land or mined substances. Inventors who have enforceable
property rights, or the ability to keep important parts of the making of a resource
secret, will also be able to restrict the supply of that resource. The composition of a
firm’s asset stock itself may be firm-specific and, thus, rare. Given the variety of asset
stocks possessed by different firms, certain firms may have accumulated more
valuable combinations of assets and found valuable uses for these assets that will
enable them to capture rents.
A firm cannot capture rents from a scarce resource unless there are limits to
the competition for the best (combinations of) resources because otherwise
competitors will bid up the price for the resource and let the owner (seller) of the
resource appropriate the rent (Peteraf, 1993). Thus, assets, or combinations thereof,
yielding competitive advantage cannot be obtained in market transactions, unless the
purchaser possesses superior insight regarding the value of the asset or happens to
be lucky to acquire them before their true value becomes known (Barney, 1986),
except if the acquirer has obtained bargaining power, for example, through other
transactions with the seller.  The value of a resource may also change after its
acquisition, allowing the possessor to obtain competitive advantage. This may
happen when the demand for the resource increases after it has been acquired,
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because new applications have been discovered by customers.
This may be an important reason for undertaking asset sharing, where assets
are (partly) transferred to new and more valuable applications. Asset sharing may
lead to the discovery of more valuable applications through internal experimentation
and learning of new productive opportunities in which case the asset becomes more
valuable than it was at the time of purchase, and this could not have been anticipated
at the time of purchase.
Furthermore, there has to be limited possibilities for selling the resources
individually, or in valuable combinations (i.e. market failures) at a price equal to
their value to the firm, since the firm would then be equally well (or better) off selling
the resources, because any cost of exploiting the resources is transferred to the buyer.
Differences in the valuation of resources and capabilities may persist after the
acquisition, because of asymmetrical information regarding the quality and
productive opportunities of the asset. If the cost of communicating the true value of
the asset are high (i.e. high measurement costs), it will prevent capture of rents from
resale and thus lead to the asset being used internally. Geographical immobility (site
specificity) of resources and capabilities, for example due to cost of relocation also
presents an impediment to trading resources and capabilities, which makes internal
application more profitable.  Quasi-rents obtained from combination with non-
transferable firm-specific assets may not be recoupable through sale and
consequently favor use within the firm (Grant, 1991).
Finally, competitors must be unable to match the firm’s offerings by
imitating the resources or substituting them with others that yield comparable
outcomes, because imitation increases supply while substitution lowers demand
which will lower the price that can be obtained for the products (Peteraf, 1993).
These conditions for sustainable competitive advantage are evidently
interconnected or overlapping, because, for example, resources that are cheap to
imitate cannot be rare (for long). Likewise, the value of a resource is related to the
supply of the resource because if anyone can acquire the resource it cannot confer
differentiation or cost advantages. A resource which has close substitutes will not be
rare in the economic sense since scarcity is defined on the basis of supply relative to
demand.
Combined insights from the resource-based perspective and the
positioning stream
It may be argued that both RBP and the positioning stream have developed
from the same basic insight from industrial organization, that is, that barriers to
competition at different levels allow various types of rents to be earned. Thus, in the
works of Porter the barriers to competition are described at the level of business units
(Porter, 1980, 1987), activities (Porter, 1985), sets of activities (Porter and Rivkin,
1998) and nation states (Porter, 1990, 1991). These different levels of barriers to
competition are interconnected and form a chain of causality explaining competitive
success (Porter, 1991). The resource-based perspective looks at barriers to
competition at the level of resources which could be identified as a level lying in
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between the initial conditions (the nation state) and the level of activities. Various
types of rents can also be distinguished. Thus rents may stem from innovation
granting returns from uniqueness of offerings or processes (i.e. Schumpeterian rents),
scarce natural resources in fixed supply may grant Ricardian rents, while superior
positions protected from competition may create monopoly rents. Finally the ability
to employ resources in higher valued uses may create quasi-rents (Peteraf, 1993).
The main difference between the two perspectives is the source of the
barriers, which is either ascribed to factor market imperfections or the existence of
market power (product market imperfections). The two streams may be
complementary in the insights they offer, to the extent that the positioning stream
has added some insights into which resources a firm needs to accumulate in order to
stay competitive (e.g. Key Success Factors, or Industry Specific Factors, cf. Amit and
Schoemaker, 1993), whereas the resource-based stream has added insights into the
conditions surrounding the efficient acquisition and accumulation of resources (e.g.
Barney, 1986, Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Besides, only looking at one side of the coin,
to borrow a phrase from Wernerfelt (1984), could be misleading because it is
impossible to determine the scarcity and substitutability of a resource without
examining competitors’ asset stocks, just like identification of attractive industries
and positions within industries would be futile without assessment of the firm’s own
productive capabilities, because these determine if its possible for the firm to enter
attractive industries. Thus, Chatterjee and Wernerfelt find some evidence that the
type of excess resource (physical, intangible or financial) and its relatedness to the
industry under consideration are important in predicting diversification strategy and
entry mode (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Chatterjee, 1990).
Both the RBP and the positioning stream emphasize substitution as a threat
to a firm’s competitive advantage2. Substitution occurs when customer preferences
change, or when innovation produces new valued features or allow production at
lower cost (Porter, 1980; Barney, 1986). Thus, substitution may occur both at the
positioning level due to changes in preferred product characteristics (price elasticities
of features), or at the resource level, when more efficient resources become  available.
Since substitution is independent of the characteristics of the source of competitive
advantage, the likelihood of substitution depends on the rate of innovation and
changes in consumer preferences. In other words, synergies are, in general, no more,
or no less, likely to be substituted than other potential sources of competitive
advantage, because the risk of substitution depends on the relative efficiency of
potentially substituting resources and activities. A firm pursuing synergy may,
                                                          
2 The emphasis on substitution rather than (or the neglect of) innovation in both the Barney/Peteraf version of the
resource-based perspective and the positioning framework is derived from their common IO heritage which build
on a static equilibrium assumption (cf. Jacobson, 1992). Barney (1986) does mention innovation as a source of
substitution, though. If continuous, endogenous innovation was allowed within the frameworks, the assumption of
equilibrium would be meaningless, since there cannot be an equilibrium, if the competitive situation is constantly
changed. The static equilibrium assumption seams almost paradoxical, at least to the resource-based perspective
given its simultaneous emphasis on heterogeneity (cf. Jacobson, 1992) and the notable evolutionary influence in
the work of Penrose (1959). However, the static equilibrium assumption may be viewed as more restrictive, i.e.
that it is more difficult to obtain lasting advantages in markets in states of (near) equilibrium, whereas
disequilibrium frameworks view advantages as ordinary, but temporary.
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however, be more vulnerable to substitution because substitution of a resource will
also affect the activities and resources to which the substituted resource is connected.
In other words, it may be difficult for a firm to replace a resource or activity which
has been rendered obsolete, because the firm will also have to reconfigure the whole
system of resources and activities.
Common to both research traditions is also their emphasis on imitability of
the sources of competitive advantage, whether they be productive efficiencies
stemming from superior resources, superior organization of transactions, or superior
positions. Thus, the important question regarding the sustainability of synergistic
advantages would be if competitors are able to imitate the activities involved in
creating synergies. From the above discussion, synergies may be protected at one or
more of three different levels, that is, at the level of resource deployment analyzed in
the RBP; at the level of organizing associated transactions, and at the level of
industry position. Protection at either level may be sufficient, but in the, realistic, case
of only partial protection at either level, combining barriers to imitation at multiple
levels may enhance protection against imitation by raising the cost of imitation3.
III. Imitability of synergies
The combined insights from the positioning and resource-based literatures
tells us that imitation may be prevented both by lack of motivation, and by lack of
ability. Thus, even if imitation is technically possible, firms may choose not to imitate
because imitation will shift the supply curve to a point where rents cannot be earned
if capacity is increased in large increments relative to demand (e.g. if MES is high)
(Ghemawat, 1991). For commitments to be effective, however, they must be costly to
abandon, otherwise the threat of retaliation will not be credible.  The commitment
will also have to be easily observable, and the implications well understood, or
competitors might overlook or misinterpret the competitive implications and go
ahead anyway (Porter and Rivkin, 1998). Imitation may also be prevented by legal
restrictions in the form of patents and entrenched trademarks and, directly through
restrictions on entry in certain sectors (Rumelt, 1984). Likewise, supplier and buyer
switching costs may prevent a firm from capitalizing on an imitated asset and
therefore remove the incentive to imitate.
The ability of competitors to successfully imitate another firm’s asset stocks is
greatly reduced in the presence of five isolating mechanisms described by Dierickx
and Cool (1989), namely
• Time compression diseconomies, which exists when a given level of expenditure over
a particular period of time produces a larger increment in the asset stock than the
same level of expenditure over a shorter period of time. Crash R&D-programs
                                                          
3 Off course, certain resources may be strictly inimitable, such as particular locations and certain natural
resources which cannot be manufactured artificially, but for most resources inimitability is probably more a
question of imitation cost vs. benefits of imitation than of strict inimitability. The same goes for imitation of
organizational setups and position, where apparent inimitability results from high costs, for example, because
other transactions may be organized less appropriately if another organizational setup is implemented (cf.
Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998), or decreased benefits caused by increased competition for the same group of
customers (Ghemawat, 1991, 1996).
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undertaken to catch up with competitors will, in the absence of an opportunity to
copy results directly (reverse engineering),  require more resources, than
programs spread over longer periods of time.
• Asset mass efficiencies, which exists when adding to an existing asset stock is
facilitated by possessing high levels of that stock. Thus gaining shelf-space or
access to new distribution channels will be easier for an established company, than
for a newcomer, because they can demonstrate success of their products.
• Asset stock erosion, which occur in the absence of adequate expenditure in
maintaining the asset stock. With investments in long-lived, dedicated assets, a
company can show its determination to stay in that business and deter entry from
potential competitors.
• Asset stock interconnectedness, which exists when adding to an existing asset stock
depends not just on the level of that stock, but also on the level of other stocks. A
service-network may facilitate new product development by granting access to
consumer experiences and wishes. Likewise, a service-network may be a condition
for building a reputation for high quality.
• Causal ambiguity, which exists when it is impossible to identify or control the
variables leading to the accumulation of the assets. Causal ambiguity may be
caused by tacitness of the knowledge involved in rent generation, in which those
who perform the value creating activities themselves do not know, or are unable
to explain, the activities they perform and/or their relationship with the results
(Reed and DeFillippi, 1990). Complexity caused by a high number of interrelated
activities or possible relationships also makes it difficult for an individual to grasp
the sources of competitive advantage (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990). Reed and
DeFillippi (1990) moreover mention relationship-specific investments as causes of
causal ambiguity, but the effect of specific investments is more likely to be of the
commitment variety (i.e. deterrence), which probably will work better in the
absence of causal ambiguity4. The success of the Sony walkman may be attributed
a wide variety of causes, such as the insight of Akio Morita, serendipity, the
concurrent inside development of both earphones and portable tape-recorders,
Sony’s dealer-network being able to provide fast feedback on consumer reactions
and preferences etc. The large number of possible, and possibly intertwined,
causes of success makes it difficult for competitors to know which asset stocks to
imitate in order to erode Sony’s competitive advantage in product innovation.
The following sections will discuss how commitments and isolating
mechanisms affect the imitability of complementarities and asset sharing.
                                                          
4 Thus, if competitors know the amount of relationship specific investments sunk into a relationship, entry will be
deterred because of fear of retaliation. Because unilateral relationship specific investments are unlikely unless
accompanied by safeguards (Williamson, 1985), both unilateral and bilateral relationship specific investments are
associated with switching costs which have to be overcome by the competitor who wishes to break the
relationship before the transaction is completed. The more well-understood (i.e. the less causal ambiguity
surrounding the relationship), the less likely will competitors be to try to imitate the activities and resources of
the relationship, unless, of course, causal ambiguity leads competitors to systematically overestimate the size of
the specific investments. The fact that “the business actions that result from resource and skill deployment
(competencies) can be highly specific and interdependent with the firm’s internal and external transaction
partners” (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990: 92, emphasis added) does not explain why the interactions become
difficult to observe or understand, although they may become so, depending on their tacitness and complexity.
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Imitability of complementarities
Porter (1996) discussed sustainability in relation to sharing and fit (comple-
mentarity), and argued that while asset sharing may only lead to short term
enhancements of performance because sharing is comparably easy to imitate,
achieving fit between complementary activities leads to sustainable competitive
advantage, because “rivals will get little benefit from imitation unless they successfully
match the whole system.” (Porter, 1996: 74).
Complementarities are likely to be protected from imitation by causal
ambiguity because the firm is in a better position to obtain knowledge about the
interaction among activities than outsiders. Time compression diseconomies, asset
mass efficiencies or asset stock interconnectedness are in themselves examples of
complementarities. Imitation of complementarities are furthermore protected from
imitation by the fact that similar competitive advantage may only be obtained by
competitors by imitating all of the assets and activities (Porter, 1996). The barrier to
imitation created by complementarity does not stem from the sheer number of
activities and assets that must be copied because, without interaction effects, partial
imitation may close some of the gap between the imitator and the superior rival.
However, uncertainty as to which specific activities that yield advantage (causal
ambiguity), and to how these activities can be imitated will lower the probability of
successful imitation. If the costs of imitation vary with the number of activities and
the probability of successfully imitating each activity is less than 1, then the
probability of successfully imitating all of the activities decreases with the number of
activities, in which case imitation is deterred by increasing number of activities
because the expected benefit decreases while the total cost increases (Porter and
Rivkin, 1998).
The limits to managerial capacity, and to its rate of expansion, described by
Penrose (1959) can add to the problems of imitating systems of activities, compared
to imitation of individual assets or activities in three ways. First of all, limits to
managerial capacity limits the number of activities that can be imitated within a
period of time. This will limit the probability of successful imitation if the superior
firm is capable of further developing its capabilities, which makes speed of imitation
important. Speed of imitation may also be important for the imitating firm if the
opportunity for exploiting the imitated activities is available for a limited time only,
for example in case of changing customer preferences, high levels of innovative
activity or early mover advantages. Secondly, limits to managerial capacity may
create increasing marginal costs to imitation because managerial capacity has to be
diverted from increasingly valuable activities and thus raise the opportunity costs of
imitation. Thirdly, limits to managerial capacity may lower the probability of
successful imitation because managerial attention is diluted as the number of
imitation activities increase (i.e. managers can only spend less time on each project
whereby the risk of errors increase).
Imitability of asset sharing
If an asset is inimitable, sharing will lead to sustainable competitive
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advantage if the asset have excess capacity, because the asset itself is inaccessible to
competitors. Assets that can be used for a wide range of purposes cannot signal
commitment to a strategy because they can be redeployed at low cost. Since asset
sharing implies flexibility and low cost of redeployment, asset sharing will not deter
imitation. Flexible assets will therefore offer little protection from imitation
(Ghemawat and del Sol, 1998). However, if the range of applications for a shared
asset is narrow, then it may not be redeployable at low cost if the demand for the
services of the asset in the alternative applications are too low to ensure full capacity
utilization. If coordination costs are assumed to increase with the number of
applications, then the fact that an asset is shared implies that the asset cannot be fully
utilized if one of the present applications is stopped. Thus, asset sharing may signal
commitment to the present pattern of utilization if the competitors cannot observe
alternative applications of the asset within the firm. Even when a number of
competitors possess similar stocks of assets and target similar market segments they
may maintain high returns through mutual forbearance if none of the firms can
deploy their shared assets in markets in which the other firms are excluded (Gimeno
and Woo, 1999).
The value of a given asset in a particular application depends on both the
flexibility of the asset itself, and the requirements posed by the users. A very flexible
asset will be able to fulfill very diverse requirements of potential users, but may be
less productive (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988)5. Greater similarity of the
requirements posed by the users will allow shared exploitation of more specific
assets (and therefore often less flexible assets according to Montgomery and
Wernerfelt (1988)). Assets which are specific to a particular use are more likely to
bring competitive advantage because their specialization to a narrow range of
purposes both raise their efficiency and signal a commitment to pursuing a strategy
that will ensure their utilization, because the investment will otherwise be lost
(Ghemawat, 1991). Thus, the value of asset sharing depends on whether the different
applications are related in terms of the requirements of the users.
Asset sharing based on generic physical equipment or financial resources
may therefore be more easily imitated by competitors, and therefore lead to short
term advantages only. Asset sharing of imitable assets may, however, be protected
from imitation if competitors cannot adopt a similar range of activities, for example,
if they lack the complementary assets (Teece, 1986) to commercialize the outputs
from sharing in other areas. If the range of applications, and the consequent
adaptations of assets, is firm-specific, sharing will also be hard to imitate unless
                                                          
5 Montgomery and Wernerfelt’s argument seem tautological because they define more flexible assets (less
specific factors in their terminology) as “those that lose less efficiency as they are applied farther from their
origin.” (1988: 625). However, if there were no efficiency gains in specializing assets to particular purposes, then
there would be no problems of specificity in inter-firm transactions because generic assets would be equally
efficient and incur fewer transaction costs. Thus, transaction cost economics assumes that less specific assets at
least in some cases are less efficient (result in higher production costs) than specialized assets. This may be
especially true for physical assets, whereas flexible intangible assets may be equally valuable in different
applications, for example in case of trademarks, reputations and patents. Other intangible assets such as
managerial capabilities may on average worth less if they are flexible than if they are dedicated to a special
business logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986)
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competitors adopt a similar range of activities.
IV. Concluding remarks
Although synergy has usually been discussed in connection with
diversification studies and corporate strategy more generally, it is also important in
connection with competitive strategy. Thus, one way of achieving competitive
advantage is through generating and exploiting synergies between the different
assets and activities of the firm, because asset sharing and complementarities allow
assets to be used more efficiently. When firms pursue different strategies and address
different product-markets, they will acquire different asset stocks. This means that
there will also be differences in the opportunities for sharing and complementarity
presented to, and perceived by, individual firms. Synergies will therefore tend to be
firm-specific (rare).
The advantages in efficiency gained from synergy, however, can only be
sustainable if imitation of the synergistic activities is deterred by observable
commitments or impaired by isolating mechanisms such as time compression
diseconomies (e.g., due to the longevity of cooperative relationships between
business units) or asset stock interconnectedness and causal ambiguities (due to the
diversity of the assets involved and the complexity of the ways in which they link).
Complementarity decreases the probability of successful overall imitation because
the benefits of imitating all of a successful competitors assets  and activities might be
marginal if imitation of just one activity or asset fails. This problem is compounded
by limits to managerial capacity which may both prevent ascertaining all the
important interaction effects, as well as decrease the probability of imitating the
interaction effects themselves correctly because the complexity exceeds their
cognitive capacities as the number of activities increase (Porter and Rivkin, 1998).
Asset sharing is easier to imitate, but may still be protected if the asset itself is
inimitable or applicable to a narrow range of applications only.
Being scarce because of their firm-specific nature, valuable through cost or
performance advantages and hard to imitate, synergies may bring competitive
advantage to the firms exploiting them. The innovative activity of trying out new
combinations or applying assets in new applications also bring with it uncertainty of
outcomes. Uncertainty brings mistakes involving new experiments to correct them,
which means that sharing and complementarity require frequent changes that adds
to industry heterogeneity. Adapting assets to other assets to achieve
complementarity, or to other applications for sharing, make the same asset more
specific to the combination of activities in which they partake, and therefore of less
value in others. Specificity to a particular set of activities also limit the mobility of
assets, because other assets have to be moved as well in order to obtain the
advantage. This is not to argue that competitive advantage cannot be obtained from
individual assets. Thus, it can be proposed that different types of synergy may lead
to sustainable competitive advantage if:
a) The shared asset itself is scarce and difficult to imitate. Asset sharing may
furthermore lead to sustainable advantages if the outputs (services) have
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limited tradability. Asset sharing may be protected from imitation if similar
advantages would have to be obtained by adopting a similar range of
activities in order to achieve a similar scale6.
b) Complementarity is achieved among a firm-specific combination of
numerous activities and assets. Complementarity is protected from imitation
when the advantage does not stem from a single activity or asset, but from
the combination of assets and activities which require that competitors
imitate all assets and activities.
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